



Release of Surety on Sufiersedeas Bonds-Agreement for Settlement.-
Jacksonville, M. &- P. Ry. &- Nay. Co. v. Hoofier, 85 Fed. Rep. 62o.-A
judgment was recovered against a railroad company, and pending proceedings
toreview the company paidto the plaintiff a sum in cash, and delivered certain
bonds in escrow, on an agreement that, if the bonds should advance in mar-
ket value to par within a year, they should be accepted by the plaintiff in full
satisfaction of the judgment. They failed to reach the stipulated value and
were tendered back. The proceedings in error were not dismissed, but re-
sulted, after the expiration of the year, in an affirmance. Held, that such
transaction did not discharge the sureties over defendant's supersedeas bond.
Pardee, Circuit Judge, dissented, on the ground that the argument for delay
between the principals released the sureties, unless it was done with their
consent.
Street Railroads- Transfers-Rights of Passengers. -Jenkins v. Brook-
lyn Heigkts R. Co., 5i N. Y. Supp. 216. A New York law compels certain
companies to give transfers to their passengers for one continuous trip with-
out extra charge. Under this law it is not a reasonable regulation for the
company to adopt an arbitrary time limit within which such a transfer must
be used and a person holding such a transfer is justified in waiting until a car
comes along in which he can secure a seat.
Injunction-Building Restrictions.-Alvord v. Fletcher, 51 N. Y. Supp.
117. Two parcels of land were subject to the same covenant, which restricted
the class of buildings to be erected thereon and their distance from the street.
The fact that the owner of one of them is maintaining thereon a building
which violates the covenant justifies the court in refusing him a preliminary
injunction restraining the owner of the other parcel from committing a similar
breach.
Mariine Liens-Priority-Suzeiflies.-The John G. Stevens, i8 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 544. A lien for damages on a tug for negligently allowing the tow to
come into collision with another vessel will be given priority over a lien on the
tug for supplies previously furnished. All interests existing at the time
of the collision in the offending vessel-whether by way of part owner-
ship, of mortgage, of bottomry bond, or of other maritime lien for repairs or
supplies-arising out of contract with the owner of the vessel, are parts of the
vessel herself, and as such are bound by and responsible for her wrongful acts.
A suit by the owner of a tow against her tug for an injury to the tow by negli-
gence on the part of the tug is a suit ex delicto and not ex contractu.
Carriers of Goods-Freight.-Moran Bros. Co. v. NIo. Pac. R. R. Co.,
53 Pac. Rep. (Wash.) 49. When a carrier demands a sum in excess of the sum
due for freight charges, the consignee need not tender any sum before bring-
ing suit (Adams v. Clark, 9 Cush. 215); also, if the carrier has negligently
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delayed delivery of goods, or otherwise subjected itself to liability for dam-
ages in respect to the property carried, equal to or greater than the amount of
the freight, the consignee may obtain replevin without a tender; and the
claim for damages may be adjudicated in the replevin suit.
Carriers-Passengers- Extraordinary Care. - Southern Ry. Co. v.
Smith, 86 Fed. 292. Held, that where one who has a passenger ticket in his
pocket, but has not been to the depot, nor in any way notified the officers or
agents of the company that he intends to take passage, crosses the tracks to
board an outgoing train, he is not a person to whom the company owes a duty
of extraordinary care and diligence as a passenger. McCormick, J., dissented.
Executory Contract-Repbudiation by one Party-Resulting Right of
Action.-arks v. VanEeghen et al., 85 Fed. 853. Where one party to an
executory contract renounces it, without cause, before the time for performing
it has arrived, he authorizes the other party to treat it as terminated, without
prejudice to a right of action for damages, and if the latter elects to treat the
contract as terminated, his right of action accrues at once. But the evidence
of the intention to repudiate the contract must be unequivocal. This decision
is contrary to that of Daniels v. Newton, X14 Mass. 53o, approved in the re-
cent case of Clark v. Casualty Co., 67 Fed. 222. Also, the court considers as
dicta the observations to the same effect in Smoot's Case, 5 Wall. 36, and
Dingley v. Oler, I17 U. S. 490; and that the Supreme Court of the United
States has never passed upon the question directly. The present conclusion
is considered by the court to be in line with the preponderance of adjudication,
beginning with the leading English case of Hochster v. DeLa Tom, 2 El. and
Bl. 678.
Contract to make Will-Specific Performance.-Edson v. Parsons et al.,
50 N. E. Rep. (N. Y.) 2665. Two sisters, closely united by affection, and in
habits, associations and ideas, and who were also very much attached to a
brother, made their wills at the same time and under the supervision of, and
after consultation with, their counsel. The wills were alike, each sister giving
to the other three-fourths of her residuary estate, and the remainder of the
other fourth, after certain legacies were paid. It was further provided that if
the testatrix should survive her sister, or if her sister, surviving her, should
die before her will was proved, all the residue of her estate should go to her
brother. Upon the death of one of the sisters, the other made a different will,
and upon her death the brother sought to establish the provision of the first
will as a contract between the sisters to give their property ultimately to him.
Held, that the making of the wills and the attendant circumstances, were not
sufficient, as a matter of law, to establish a contract such that a court of equity
would interfere to prevent the. surviving testatrix from altering by making a
subsequent will. To invoke such an interference there must be a clear and
definite contract, arising from an express agreement or from unequivocal facts.
INSURANCE.
Insurance-Accident Policy-Injuries in a Passenger Conveyance.-
,Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Vandecar, 86 Fed. 282. An accident policy of insur-
ance provided that "if such injuries are sustained while riding as a passenger
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in a passenger conveyance using steam, cable, or electricity as the motive
power, the amount to be paid shall be double the sum above specified." Held,
Thayre, J., dissenting. that these words do not apply to one riding on the plat-
form of a railway car.
Fidelity Insurance-Construction of Contract.-American Surety Co. v.
Pauly, i8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552. A contract of fidelity insurance contained a
clause providing that the company should be notified of any act on the part of
the employe whose fidelity was insured which might involve a loss for which
the company would be responsible "as soon as practicable after the occurrence
of such act shall come to the knowledge of the employer." Held, that this did
-not require notice on mere suspicion, but that when the employer had
knowledge of such facts as would justify a careful and prudent man in charg-
ing another with fraud and dishonesty, the fidelity company should be notified.
Insurance y Life Tenant-Resulting Trust.-Sfialdng v. Miller, 45
S. W. (Ky.) 462. A life tenant of buildings had them insured for their full
value in fee simple. On loss the insurance company paid him the full amount.
Held, that in the absence of evidence of an intention on the part of the life
tenant to insure for the benefit of the remainder men, the insurance money
was not subject to a resulting trust in their favor for their share in the value of
the buildings.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
County Officers-Power of Afifointment.- State ex rel. Williams et al.,
v. Mayhew et al., 52 Pac. Rep. (Mont.) 98r. The constitution of the State of
Montana provided generally for the election or appointment of county officers.
In an action of quo wzarranto to test the validity of the appointment of such
officers chosen by the Legislature to serve provisionally in a newly-created
county, it was held that although the constitution provided for such selection,
yet the Legislature, having the power to create new counties, of necessity had
the power to carry them into effect. A county cannot be said to be created by
the sovereign power until it is endowed with the power and means to aid in
these important matters of the State (see Peo!4le v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich. 44).
Right to Vote.- Williams v. State of fississiffti i8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583.
A provision in a constitution and laws made thereunder are not void as in con-
travention of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because aimed at the char-
acteristics of the race. For members of other races would be equally debarred
by the possession of these charcteristics. Although a law, fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, may be within the constitutional provision if adminis-
tered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand so as to make
-unjust and illegal discriminations between persons of different races, yet this
maladministration must be shown as a fact. The mere possibility or probabil-
ity thereof is not enough.
Inheritance Tax-Class Legislation.-fagoun v. Illinois Trust and
Savings Bank, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594. "An inheritance tax is not one on
-succession. The right to take property by devise or descent is the creature of
the law, and the law may therefore impose conditions upon it." It is a privi-
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lege-not a natural right. A State may distinguish, select and classify objects
of legislation, and must necessarily have a wide range of discretion. The
Fourteenth Amendment requires only that the law shall operate equally and
uniformly upon all members of the class. It must appear not only that a
classification has been made, but that it is reasonable and is based on some
difference that bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification
and is not merely arbitrary. The Illinois inheritance tax law is valid. Though
the classification in accordance with which the tax varies is more or less arbi-
trary, yet it is based on reasonable grounds and does not deny the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
Ex-host Facto Law-Jury Trial.-Thomfison v. State of Utah, z8 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 620. It is ex-lostfacto legislation to make a jury in a criminal case
consist of only eight jurors instead of twelve when the crime was committed
before the act was passed. When provision was made in the United States
Constitution for trial by jury in criminal cases, it was intended that the jury
should consist of twelve men. This was binding on territories. Hence a
State cannot legally convict a man on verdict of eight jurors when his crime
was committed before the admission of the Territory as a State.
LIBEL.
Libeller se-Malice.-Cady v. Brooklyn Union Pub. Co., 51 N. Y. Supp.
x98. A false publication of a practising dentist that he had committed suicide
is libellous fer se both as it touches him in his profession and as it is calculated
to bring him into general ridicule. Malice need not be shown except in case
of words qualifiedly privileged. It never is an essential ingredient in the
action for damages for an ordinary slander or libel. It has to do only with the
question of smart money.
Matter Libelous her se.-.cFadden v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 51 N.
Y. Supp. 275. Defendant published an article concerning plaintiff, a young
lady, describing an alleged rowing race between her and another young lady
as "a race for a beau with a handsome face." Names were given and the
young man was described as being present, while "fair feminine friends"
"encouraged each earnest, anxious aspirant." Heldthat the article was libel-
ous fier se, as its effect was to bring plaintiff into contempt and ridicule.
PROCEDURE.
Action for Rent-Estofilel of Tenant-Real Party in Interest.-Mel-
cher v. Kreiser, 5i N. Y. Supp. 249. Plaintiff made a lease with the defend-
ant, lessee, describing himself "as attorney and agent for the owner, lessor."
Held, that lessee was estopped to deny the existence of the relation of landlord
and tenant between himself and plaintiff, as attorney. Held, further, that
under the code the plaintiff and not those for whom he might have been agent
was the proper person to sue, since he was the only party of the first part
thereto, and were this not so he might have maintained the action since a con-
tract had been made in his name for the benefit of another, and he became
thereby the trustee of an express trust.
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Pleading-Jurisdiction of the Supireme Court.-Kiflley v. Peopkle of Illi-
nois, iS Sup. Ct. Rep. 550. A mere allegation that a State statute is unconsti-
tutional and void will be taken to refer a contravention of the State constitu-
tion, and is not sufficient to give the United States Supreme Court jurisdiction
as over a federal question.
MISCELLANEOUS.
Mironofiolies- Unlawful Restraint of Trade.-John D. Park &, Sons Co.
v. Natl Wholesale Druggists Ass'n et at., 5o N. Y. Supp. io64. An agree-
ment between manufacturers and wholesale druggists, whereby any customer
of one of them who violates the agreement with the one in respect to cut-rate
prices, is precluded from purchasing drugs and proprietary medicines from
any combination, is unlawful, as creating a combination in restraint of trade.
A court of equity will enjoin anything done in the furtherance of such an
agreement, but will not enjoin the obtaining or imparting information as to
the manner in which the customer conducts his business, or his violation of
any agreement with any specific manufacturer or wholesale dealer, nor will it
enjoin any one of the combination from making an agreement with the custo-
mer fixing the price of sale of the goods purchased.
Attorneys-Susfiension-Grounds-Punishment.- State ex rel. State
Bar Association v. Finn, 52 Pac. Rep. (Ore.) 756. In an action for disbar-
ment it appeared that the accused had filed in a case in the Supreme Court in
which he was attorney pretended affidavits of various persons to which they
had never sworn. Held, although it was proven such was the usual manner
of administering oaths in such cases, and although the evidence in the affida-
vits was true, such conduct was a reckless and wilful disregard of principles
inconsistent with professional obligations, for which the attorney was amenable
to the court. Disbarment proceedings are not to punish the attorney, but to
protect the court in the proper administration of justice.
Commerce-Constitutional Law-Police Power-Pool Selling-State v.
Harbourne, 40 Atl. Rep. (Conn.) z79. A State statute, prohibiting the busi-
ness of transmitting money to any race track within or without the State,
there to be placed or bet on horse races, is not unconstitutional, nor opposed to
the power of Congress to regulate commerce between the States. Such
statute is rather a police regulation to prevent gambling, and even though it
incidentally affects interstate commerce it is valid (Geer v. Connecticut, 161
U. S. 519).
Trades Unions-Rights of Members-Exclusion from Work.-Davis v.
United Portable Hoisting Engineers-et al., 51 N. Y. Supp. i8o. This case,
following Allen v. Flood, held, that members of trades unions as well as
other individuals have a right to say that they will not work with persons who
do not belong to their organization, and it makes no difference whether they
say this themselves or through their organized societies. It is not illegal for
an employer to insist upon employing members of one organization only, nor
for the employee of one employer to refuse to work for him unless all his em--
ployees are members of one organization.
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Bicycle-Right of Way. -Taylor v. Union Traction Co., 4o At. Rep. (Pa.)
159. Where a bicyclist was riding in an opposite direction from a cart, but oil
the car tracks and in the same direction as the cars on that track, and a collis-
ion resulted whereby the bicyclist was injured by the cart, by reason of his
refusal to turn out, Held, that the bicyclist could not recover damages, as a
bicycle is not a vehicle within the ordinary meaning, and on an open highway,
should turn out for a cart.
